We study the communication complexity of single-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols that are based on fundamental cryptographic primitives in a black-box manner. In this setting, we establish a tight lower bound on the number of bits communicated by the server in any polynomially-preserving construction that relies on trapdoor permutations. More specifically, our main result states that in such constructions Ω(n) bits must be communicated by the server, where n is the size of the server's database, and this improves the Ω(n/ log n) lower bound due to Haitner, Hoch, Reingold and Segev (FOCS '07). Therefore, in the setting under consideration, the naive solution in which the user downloads the entire database turns out to be optimal up to constant multiplicative factors. We note that the lower bound we establish holds for the most generic form of trapdoor permutations, including in particular enhanced trapdoor permutations.
Introduction
A single-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme is a protocol between a server and a user. The server holds a database x ∈ {0, 1} n and the user holds an index i ∈ [n] to an entry of the database. Informally, the user wishes to retrieve the i th entry of the database, without revealing the index i to the server. The notion of PIR was introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [4] to model applications that enable users to query public databases without revealing any information on the specific data that the users wish to retrieve. Chor et al. showed that in the information-theoretic setting any single-server PIR protocol has the server communicating at least n bits. Therefore in this setting the naive solution in which the user downloads the entire database is optimal.
Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [26] were the first to construct a non-trivial single-server PIR protocol relying on computational assumptions. Their result initiated a sequence of papers showing that there exist singleserver PIR protocols with poly-logarithmic communication complexity based on specific number-theoretic assumptions (see, for example, [2, 3, 12, 26, 28, 41] , and a recent survey by Ostrovsky and Skeith [35] ). The only non-trivial construction based on general computational assumptions is due to Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [27] , and is based on enhanced trapdoor permutations. In their construction, however, the server is required to communicate n − o(n) bits to the user.
Motivated by this ever-growing line of work, we study the communication complexity of single-server PIR protocols that are based on fundamental primitives. We establish a linear lower bound on the number of bits communicated by the server in constructions that rely on enhanced trapdoor permutations in a blackbox manner. Therefore, in the setting under consideration in this paper, the naive solution in which the user downloads the entire database turns out to be optimal up to constant multiplicative factors. In the following paragraphs, we briefly describe the setting in which our lower bound is proved (a more formal description is provided in Section 2).
Black-box reductions. As previously mentioned, under widely believed specific number-theoretic assumptions, there are very efficient single-server PIR protocols. Therefore, if any of these assumptions holds, the existence of trapdoor permutations implies the existence of efficient single-server PIR protocols in a trivial sense. Faced with similar difficulties, Impagliazzo and Rudich [22] presented a paradigm for proving impossibility results under a restricted, yet very natural and important, subclass of reductions called black-box reductions. Informally, a black-box reduction of a primitive P to a primitive Q is a construction of P out of Q that ignores the internal structure of the implementation of Q and uses it as a "subroutine" (i.e., as a black-box). In addition, in the case of fully-black-box reductions (see, for example, [36] ), the proof of security (showing that an adversary that breaks the implementation of P implies an adversary that breaks the implementation of Q), is black-box as well, that is, the internal structure of the adversary that breaks the implementation of P is ignored.
The strength of cryptographic reductions. Luby [30] provides a classification of the strength of cryptographic reductions into three classes: linearly-preserving, polynomially-preserving and weakly-preserving. In our setting, this classification comes into play when comparing the size of the server's database and the domain of the trapdoor permutations. Very informally, a reduction of single-server PIR for an n-bit database to a family of trapdoor permutations is linearly-preserving or polynomially-preserving if it uses trapdoor permutations over Ω(n) bits. Such a reduction is weakly-preserving if it uses trapdoor permutations over Ω(n ) bits for some constant 0 < ≤ 1. In linearly-preserving and polynomially-preserving reductions we are guaranteed that breaking the constructed primitive is essentially as hard as breaking the underlying primitive. However, in weakly-preserving reductions, we are only guaranteed that breaking the constructed primitive is as hard as breaking the underlying primitive for polynomially smaller security parameters. We refer the reader to [30] is the following:
Main Theorem (Informal). In any polynomially-preserving fully-black-box construction of a single-server PIR protocol from trapdoor permutations the server communicates Ω(n) bits, where n is the size of the server's database.
As mentioned above, the combination of the results of Di Crescenzo et al. [5] and of Gennaro et al. [10] rules out the more general class of black-box reductions of single-server PIR with n − 1 bits of communication to trapdoor permutations. This result, however, does not apply to enhanced trapdoor permutations. We note that our lower bound holds for the most generic form of trapdoor permutations, and in particular for enhanced trapdoor permutations. 1 In addition, we note that our lower bound holds only for constructions which are polynomially-preserving. The construction of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [27] , which is based on enhanced trapdoor permutations in a fully-black-box manner and in which the server communicates n − o(n) bits, is only weakly-preserving (i.e., it is significantly easier to break their protocol than to break the security of the underlying family of trapdoor permutations 2 ). Thus, the question of whether a tight linear lower bound can be established for weaklypreserving constructions as well remains open.
The main technical contributions. This paper consists of two main contributions from which our lower bound is immediately obtained. First, we derive a tight lower bound on the communication complexity of black-box constructions of statistically-hiding bit-commitment schemes from trapdoor permutations. Very recently, Haitner et al. [18] proved that any polynomially-preserving fully-black-box construction of statisticallyhiding bit-commitment scheme from a family of trapdoor permutations has Ω(n/ log n) communication rounds, where n is the security parameter of the scheme. In particular, this implies a lower bound on the number of bits communicated by the sender. In this paper we manage to improve their lower bound and prove the following theorem:
Theorem (Informal) 1.1. In any polynomially-preserving fully-black-box construction of a statisticallyhiding bit-commitment scheme from a family of trapdoor permutations the sender communicates Ω(n) bits during the commit stage, where n is the security parameter of the scheme.
This lower bound asymptotically matches the upper bound given by the statistically-hiding commitment scheme of Naor et al. [31] .
In addition, we improve the efficiency of the reduction of statistically-hiding commitment schemes to single-server PIR, presented by Beimel et al. [1] . Our reduction essentially uses the reduction of Beimel et al. instantiated with a better extractor, which enables us to preserve the communication complexity of the underlying single-server PIR protocol. As stating this result turns out to involve subtle technical details, here we only state a very informal statement:
There is a linearly-preserving fully-black-box reduction of statistically-hiding commitment schemes to low-communication single-server PIR, which essentially preserves the communication complexity of the underlying single-server PIR protocol.
Paper Organization
In Section 2 we briefly present the notations and formal definitions used in this paper. In Section 3 we prove our tight lower bound on the number of bits communicated by the sender during the commit stage of statistically-hiding commitment schemes. In Section 4 we describe an improved reduction of statisticallyhiding commitment scheme to low-communication single-server PIR. Finally, in Section 5 we establish the lower bound for single-server PIR by combining our main technical contributions.
Preliminaries
We denote by Π n the set of all permutations over {0, 1} n . For an integer n, we denote by U n the uniform distribution over the set {0, 1} n . For a finite set X, we denote by x ← X the experiment of choosing an element of X according to the uniform distribution. Similarly, for a distribution D over a set X, we denote by x ← D the experiment of choosing an element of X according to the distribution D. For a distribution D we denote by supp(D) set of elements having non-zero probability under D. The min-entropy of D is defined as:
.
The statistical distance between two distributions X and Y over Ω is denoted SD(X, Y), and defined as
In our construction of a statistically-hiding commitment scheme from single-server PIR we will be using the following explicit construction of strong extractors, which is obtained as a corollary of [40, Corollary 3.4] . Proposition 2.2. For any k ∈ ω(log(n)), there exists an explicit strong (k, 2 1−k )-extractor EXT :
The following standard fact (see, for example [38, Fact 2.6]) will be useful for us in analyzing statisticallyclose distributions. 
Trapdoor Permutations
We briefly present the notion of trapdoor permutations, and refer the reader to [15] for a more comprehensive discussion. A collection of trapdoor permutations is represented by a triplet of the form τ = G, F, F −1 . Informally, G corresponds to a key generation procedure, which is queried on a string td (intended as the "trapdoor") and produces a corresponding public key pk. The procedure F is the actual collection of permutations, which is queried on a public key pk and an input x. Finally, the procedure F −1 is the inverse of F: If G(td) = pk and F(pk, x) = y, then F −1 (td, y) = x. In this paper, since we are concerned with providing a lower bound, we do not consider the most general definition of a collection of trapdoor permutations. Instead, we denote by T n the set of all triplets τ n = G n , F n , F −1 n of the following form:
2. F n : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a function such that F n (pk, ·) ∈ Π n for every pk ∈ {0, 1} n .
n is a function such that F −1 n (td, y) returns the unique x ∈ {0, 1} n for which F n (G n (td), x) = y.
Our lower bound proof is based on analyzing random instances of such collections. A uniformly distributed τ n ∈ T n can be chosen as follows: G n is chosen uniformly at random from Π n , and for each pk ∈ {0, 1} n a permutation F n (pk, ·) is chosen uniformly and independently at random from Π n .
of trapdoor permutations is s(n)-hard if for every probabilistic Turing-machine A that runs in time s(n), and for all sufficiently large n,
where the probability is taken uniformly over all the possible choices of td ∈ {0, 1} n and y ∈ {0, 1} n , and over all the possible outcomes of the internal coin tosses of A.
Definition 2.4 refers to the difficulty of inverting a random permutation F(pk, ·) on a uniformly distributed image y, when given only pk = G(td) and y. Some applications, however, require enhanced hardness conditions. For example, it may be required (cf. [16, Appendix C] ) that it is hard to invert F(pk, ·) on y even given the random coins used in the generation of y. Note that our formulation captures such hardness condition as well and therefore the impossibility results proved in this paper hold also for enhanced trapdoor permutations. 3 
Single-Server Private Information Retrieval
A single-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme is a protocol between a server and a user. The server holds a database x ∈ {0, 1} n and the user holds an index i ∈ [n] to an entry of the database. Very informally, the user wishes to retrieve the i th entry of the database, without revealing the index i to the server. More formally, a single-server PIR scheme is defined via a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time Turingmachines (S, U) such that:
• S receives as input a string x ∈ {0, 1} n . Following its interaction it does not have any output.
• U receives as input an index i ∈ [n]. Following its interaction it outputs a value b ∈ {0, 1, ⊥}.
Denote by b ← S(x), U(i) the experiment in which S and U interact (using the given inputs and uniformly chosen random coins), and then U outputs the value b. It is required that there exists a negligible function ν(n), such that for all sufficiently large n, and for every string x = x 1 • · · · • x n ∈ {0, 1} n , it holds that x i ← S(x), U(i) with probability at least 1 − ν(n) over the random coins of both S and R.
In order to define the security properties of such schemes, we first introduce the following notation. Given a single-server PIR scheme (S, U) and a Turing-machine S * (a malicious server), we denote by view S * ,U(i) (n) the distribution on the view of S * when interacting with U(i) where i ∈ [n]. This view consists of its random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from U, where the distribution is taken over the random coins of both S * and U. Definition 2.5. A single-server PIR scheme (S, U) is secure if for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turingmachines S * and D, and for every two sequences of indices {i n } ∞ i=1 and { j n } ∞ i=1 where i n , j n ∈ [n] for every n, it holds that
for some negligible function ν(n) and for all sufficiently large n.
Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme is a two-stage interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver. Informally, after the first stage of the protocol, which is referred to as the commit stage, the sender is bound to at most one value, not yet revealed to the receiver. In the second stage, which is referred to as the reveal stage, the sender reveals its committed value to the receiver. More formally, a commitment scheme is defined via a triplet of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing-machines (S, R, V) such that:
• S receives as input the security parameter 1 n and a string x ∈ {0, 1} k . Following its interaction, it outputs some information decom (the decommitment).
• R receives as input the security parameter 1 n . Following its interaction, it outputs a state information com (the commitment).
• V (acting as the receiver in the reveal stage 4 ) receives as input the security parameter 1 n , a commitment com and a decommitment decom. It outputs either a string x ∈ {0, 1} k or ⊥.
Denote by (decom|com) ← S(1 n , x), R(1 n ) the experiment in which S and R interact (using the given inputs and uniformly chosen random coins), and then S outputs decom while R outputs com. It is required that for all n, every string x ∈ {0, 1} k , and every pair (decom|com) that may be output by S(1 n , x), R(1 n ) , it holds that V(com, decom) = x. 5 In the remainder of the paper, it will often be convenient for us to identify V with R, and refer to a commitment scheme as a pair (S, R).
The security of a commitment scheme can be defined in two complementary ways, protecting against either an all-powerful sender or an all-powerful receiver. In this paper, we deal with commitment schemes of the latter type, which are referred to as statistically-hiding commitment schemes. In order to define the security properties of such schemes, we first introduce the following notation. Given a commitment scheme (S, R) and a Turing-machine R * , we denote by view S(x),R * (n) the distribution on the view of R * when interacting with S(1 n , x). This view consists of R * 's random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from S. The distribution is taken over the random coins of both S and R * . Note that whenever no computational restrictions are assumed on R * , without loss of generality we can assume that R * is deterministic. Definition 2.6. A commitment scheme (S, R) is ρ(n)-hiding if for every deterministic Turing-machine R * , and for every two sequences of strings {x n } ∞ i=1 and {x n } ∞ i=1 where x n , x n ∈ {0, 1} k(n) for every n the ensembles {view S(x n ),R * (n)} and {view S(x n ),R * (n)} have statistical difference at most ρ(n) for all sufficiently large n. Such a scheme is statistically-hiding if it is ρ(n)-hiding for some negligible function ρ(n).
Our lower bound for commitment schemes holds in fact under a weaker hiding requirement. We derive our results even for commitment schemes in which the sender is statistically protected only against an honest receiver. Such schemes are referred to as statistically-hiding honest-receiver commitment schemes. Formally, it is only required that the statistical difference between the ensembles {view S(x n ),R (n)} and {view S(x n ),R (n)} is some negligible function of n. Definition 2.7. A commitment scheme (S, R, V) is µ(n)-binding if for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing-machine S * it holds that the probability that ((decom, decom )|com) ← S * (1 n ), R(1 n ) (where the probability is over the random coins of both S * and R) such that V(com, decom) V(com, decom ) and
⊥ is negligible in n for all sufficiently large n. Such a scheme is computationally-binding if it is µ(n)-binding for some negligible function µ(n), and is weakly-binding if it is (1 − 1/p(n))-binding for some polynomial p(n).
Black-Box Reductions
A reduction of a primitive P to a primitive Q is a construction of P out of Q. Such a construction consists of showing that if there exists an implementation C of Q, then there exists an implementation M C of P. This is equivalent to showing that for every adversary that breaks M C , there exists an adversary that breaks C. Such a reduction is semi-black-box if it ignores the internal structure of Q's implementation, and it is fully-black-box if the proof of correctness is black-box as well, i.e., the adversary for breaking Q ignores the internal structure of both Q's implementation and of the (alleged) adversary breaking P. Semi-black-box reductions are less restricted and thus more powerful than fully-black-box reductions. A taxonomy of black-box reductions was provided by Reingold, Trevisan and Vadhan [36] , and the reader is referred to their paper for a more complete and formal view of these notions.
We now formally define the class of constructions considered in this paper. Our results in the current paper are concerned with the particular setting of fully-black-box constructions of single-server PIR and of statistically-hiding commitment schemes from trapdoor permutations. We focus here on specific definitions for these particular primitives and we refer the reader to [36] for a more general definition.
When examining efficiency measures of fully-black-box constructions, an essential parameter for such characterizations, as introduced by Haitner et al. [18] , is the security-parameter-expansion of the construction. Consider, for example, a fully-black-construction of a commitment scheme from a family of trapdoor permutations. One ingredient of such a construction is a machine A that attempts to break the security of the trapdoor permutation family given oracle access to any malicious sender S * that breaks the security of the commitment scheme. Then, A receives a security parameter 1 n (and possibly some additional inputs) and invokes S * in a black-box manner. The standard definition does not restrict the range of security parameters that A is allowed to invoke S * on. For example, A may invoke S * on security parameter 1 n 2 , or even on security parameter 1 Θ(s(n)) , where s(n) is the running time of A. In this paper, we will use the notion (n)-expanding for short, and note that according to Luby's classification [30] , any polynomially-preserving reduction is O(n)-expanding in our terminology. Definition 2.8. A fully-black-box (n)-expanding construction of a single-server PIR scheme from an s(n)-hard family of trapdoor permutations is a triplet of probabilistic oracle Turing-machines (S, U, A) for which the following hold:
1. Correctness: For every family τ of trapdoor permutations, (S τ , U τ ) is a single-server PIR scheme.
Black-box proof of security: For every family
of trapdoor permutations and for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing-machine S * , if S * with oracle access to τ breaks the security of (S τ , U τ ), then
for infinitely many values of n, where A runs in time s(n) and invokes S * on security parameters which are at most 1 (n) . The probability is taken uniformly over all the possible choices of td ∈ {0, 1} n and y ∈ {0, 1} n , and over all the possible outcomes of the internal coin tosses of A.
Definition 2.9. A fully-black-box (n)-expanding construction of a weakly-binding and statistically-hiding honest-receiver commitment scheme from an s(n)-hard family of trapdoor permutations is a triplet of probabilistic oracle Turing-machines (S, R, A) for which the following hold:
1. Correctness: For every family τ of trapdoor permutations, (S τ , R τ ) is a statistically-hiding honestreceiver commitment scheme.
2. Black-box proof of binding:
of trapdoor permutations and for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing-machine S * , if S * with oracle access to τ breaks the binding of (S τ , R τ ), then
We remark that the above correctness requirements are very strict and are not essential for our results. For example, in the setting of commitment schemes, for every τ such that the protocol (S τ , R τ ) is a weakly-binding statistically-hiding honest-receiver commitment scheme, we construct a malicious sender S * which breaks the binding property of the scheme. Therefore, we could have dealt with weaker correctness requirements as well, but stating such a weaker requirement in a meaningful way turns out to be quite subtle.
Communication Lower Bound for Statistically-Hiding Commitment Schemes
In this section we prove a lower bound on the communication complexity of fully-black-box constructions of statistically-hiding commitment schemes from trapdoor permutations. We establish a lower bound on the number of bits communicated by the sender during the commit stage of any such scheme. Since we are interested in proving an impossibility result for commitment schemes, it will be sufficient for us to deal with bit-commitment schemes. We prove the following theorem:
. In any fully-black-box O(n)-expanding construction of a weakly-binding statistically-hiding honest-receiver bit-commitment scheme from a family of trapdoor permutations, the sender communicates Ω(n) bits during the commit stage.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 follows the approach and technique of Haitner at el. [18] who constructed a "collision-finding" oracle in order to derive a lower bound on the round complexity of statistically-hiding commitment schemes. Given any fully-black-box O(n)-expanding construction (S, R, A) of a weakly-binding statistically-hiding honest-receiver bit-commitment scheme from a family of trapdoor permutations τ, we show that relative to their oracle the following holds: (1) there exists a malicious sender S * that breaks the binding of the scheme (S τ , R τ ), and (2) if the sender communicates o(n) bits during the commit stage of (S τ , R τ ), then the machine A (with oracle access to S * ) fails to break the security of τ.
The Oracle
We briefly describe the oracle constructed by Haitner et al. [18] and state its main property. The oracle is of the form O = (τ, Sam τ ), where τ is a family of trapdoor permutations (i.e., τ = {τ n } ∞ n=1 , where τ n ∈ T n for every n), and Sam τ is an oracle that, very informally, receives as input a description of a circuit C (which may contain τ-gates) and a string z, and outputs a uniformly distributed preimage of z under the mapping defined by C. As discussed in [18] , several essential restrictions are imposed on the querying of Sam that prevent it from assisting in inverting τ.
Description of Sam. The oracle Sam receives as input a query of the form Q = (C τ next , C τ , z), and outputs a pair (w , z ) where w is a uniformly distributed preimage of z under the mapping defined by the circuit C τ , and z = C τ next (w ). We impose the following restrictions:
1. z was the result of a previous query with C τ as the next-query circuit (note that this imposes a forest-like structure on the queries).
The circuit C τ
next is a refinement of the circuit C τ , where by a refinement we mean that C τ next (w) = (C τ (w), C τ (w)) for some circuit C τ and for every w. In particular, this implies that C τ and C τ next have the same input length. Given a query Q, we denote this input length by m(Q), and when the query Q is clear from the context we will write only m.
3. Each query contains a security parameter 1 n , and Sam answers queries only up to depth depth(n), for some "depth restriction" function depth : N → N which is a part of the description of Sam. The security parameter is set such that a query with security parameter 1 n is allowed to contain circuits with queries to permutations on up to n bits. Note that although different queries may have different security parameters, we ask that in the same "query-tree", all queries will have the same security parameter (hence the depth of the tree is already determined by the root query).
In order to impose these restrictions, Sam is equipped with a family sign = {sign k } ∞ k=1 of (random) functions sign k : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} 2k that will be used as "signatures" for identifying legal queries as follows: in addition to outputting (w , z ), Sam will also output the value sign(1 n , C τ next , z , dep + 1), where dep is the depth of the query, 1 n is the security parameter of the query, and by applying the "function" sign we actually mean that we apply the function sign k for the correct input length. Each query of the form
Finally, Sam is provided with a family of (random) permutations F = { f Q }, where for every possible query Q a permutation f Q is chosen uniformly at random from Π m(Q) . Given a query Q = (1 n , C τ next , C τ , z, dep, sig), the oracle Sam uses the permutation f Q ∈ F in order to sample w as follows: it outputs w = f Q (t) for the lexicographically smallest t ∈ {0, 1} m such that C τ ( f Q (t)) = z. Note that whenever the permutation f Q is chosen from Π m uniformly at random, and independently of all other permutations in F , then w is indeed a uniformly distributed preimage of z. In this paper, whenever we consider the probability of an event over the choice of the family F , we mean that for each query Q a permutation f Q is chosen uniformly at random from Π m(Q) and independently of all other permutations. A complete and formal description of the oracle is provided in Figure 1 . 
One of the main properties of the oracle Sam, as proved in [18] , is the following: any circuit with oracle access to Sam that tries to invert a random trapdoor permutation, fails with high probability. More specifically,
τ,F ,sign depth acts as follows: Haitner et al. managed to relate this success probability to the maximal depth of the Sam-queries made by the circuit, and to the size of the circuit. They proved the following theorem: 
Breaking Low-Communication Statistically-Hiding Commitment Schemes
We show that a random instance of the oracle Sam can be used to break the binding of any statistically-hiding commitment scheme. Specifically, for every bit-commitment scheme (S, R) which is (1) weakly-biding, (2) statistically-hiding against an honest-receiver, and (3) has oracle access to a family τ of trapdoor permutations, we construct a malicious sender S * which has oracle access to Sam τ,F ,sign depth , and breaks the binding of (S τ , R τ ) with sufficiently high probability over the choices of τ, F and sign. Formally, the following theorem is proved: 
for all sufficiently large n, where depth(n) =
c(n)
log n + 1. In what follows we introduce the notation used in this section. We proceed with a brief presentation of the main ideas underlying the proof of Theorem 3.4. Then, we formally describe the malicious sender S * and analyze its success probability in order to prove Theorem 3.4.
Notations. Let (S, R) be a bit-commitment scheme with oracle access to a family of trapdoor permutations. We denote by b ∈ {0, 1} and r S , r R ∈ {0, 1} * the input bit of the sender and the random coins of the sender and the receiver, respectively. We denote by c(n) the maximal number of bits communicated from the sender to the receiver in the commit stage with security parameter 1 n . In addition we denote by d(n) the number of communication rounds in the scheme with security parameter 1 n , and without loss of generality we assume that the receiver makes the first move. Each communication round consists of a message sent from the receiver to the sender followed by a message sent from the sender to the receiver. We denote by q i and a i the messages sent by the receiver and the sender in the i-th round, respectively, and denote by a d+1 the message sent by 
. , q i ). A generic d-round
bit-commitment scheme is described in Figure 2 .
Although the sender is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing-machine, in order to interact with the oracle Sam we need to identify the sender with a sequence of polynomial-size circuits S 1 , . . . , S d+1 as follows. In the first round, S sends a 1 by computing a 1 = S 1 (b, r S , q 1 ). Similarly, in the following rounds, S sends a i by computing a i = S i (b, r S ,q i ).
Finally, in order to simplify the notation regarding the input and output of the oracle Sam, in this section we ignore parts of the input and output of Sam: we ignore the security parameter and the "signatures" (since our malicious sender S * will only ask legal queries), and consider queries of a simplified form Q = (C τ next , C τ , z), and answers that consist only of w (i.e., an answer consists only of a uniformly distributed preimage of z under the mapping defined by C τ ). In addition, in what follows it will be more intuitive to replace z in the queries by its preimage w, but this is clearly not essential.
A brief overview. Informally, recall that the oracle Sam described in Section 3.1 acts as follows: Sam is given as input a query Q = (C next , C, z), and outputs a pair (w , z ) where w is a uniformly distributed preimage of z under the mapping defined by the circuit C, and z = C next (w ). In addition, we imposed the restriction that there was a previous query (C, ·, ·) that was answered by (w, z) (note that this imposes a forest-like structure on the queries), and we only allow querying Sam up to depth O(n/ log n).
Given a statistically-hiding bit-commitment scheme in which the sender communicates c(n) bits during the commit stage, we assume without loss of generality that the commit stage of the scheme has c(n) communication rounds, where in each round the sender communicates a single bit to the receiver. The malicious sender S * operates as follows: it chooses a random input w (consisting of random coins and a random committed bit), and during the first log n rounds it simulates the honest sender. In these log n rounds, it receives log n messages q 1 , . . . , q log n from the receiver. Then, S * constructs the circuit C q 1 ,...,q log n that receives as input the sender's input w and outputs the log n sender's messages corresponding to the receiver's messages q 1 , . . . , q log n . This circuit is used to query Sam for a random input w 1 . It may be the case, however, that w 1 is not consistent with the actual messages a 1 , . . . , a log n that S * sent in the first log n rounds. In this case, S * "rewinds" Sam for a polynomial number of times, and since the total length of the sender's messages in these log n rounds is only log n bits, then with sufficiently high probability S * will obtain a consistent w 1 . Now, in the next log n rounds the malicious sender S * simulates the honest sender with input w 1 , and at the end of these log n rounds it will query (and rewind) Sam again for another consistent input w log n+1 , and so on. Finally, after completing the commit stage, S * queries Sam to obtain two random inputs w c(n) and w c(n) which are consistent with the transcript of the commit stage. Since the commitment scheme is statistically-hiding, with probability roughly half they can be used to break the binding of the protocol. A crucial point in this description, is that S * queries Sam only up to depth c(n)/ log n (S * used Sam to obtain c(n)/ log n values w 1 , w log n+1 , . . . , w c(n) ). Therefore, if c(n) = o(n), then an oracle Sam that answers queries only up to depth c(n)/ log n cannot be used to invert a random trapdoor permutation, according to Theorem 3.3.
A formal description of S * . Given a bit-commitment scheme (S, R) in which the sender communicates c(n) bits during the commit stage, we assume without loss of generality (and for simplicity of the presentation) that the scheme has c(n) communication rounds (i.e., d(n) = c(n)) where in each round during the commit stage the sender communicates a single bit to the receiver (i. e., each of a 1 , . . . , a d(n) is one bit). Furthermore, in order to simplify the description of S * , we assume that log n is an integral value (where 1 n is the security parameter given as input to S * ) and that c(n) = M · log n + 1 for some integer M = M(n). We stress that these assumptions are not at all essential, but avoiding them will result in a more complicated description. On input 1 n , the malicious sender S * with oracle access to Sam τ,F ,sign depth interacts with the honest receiver R as follows. (b) In every round i ∈ {2, . . . , log n}, S * simulates the honest sender S with input w 1 . That is, S * receives R's message q i and replies with a i = S i (b 1 , r 1 ,q i ).
(c) In round log n + 1, S * receives R's message q log n+1 , and computes the description of the circuit C log n+1 = S log n+1 (·, ·,q log n+1 ) obtained from the circuit S log n+1 by fixingq log n+1 as its third input. Then, S * queries Sam τ,F ,sign depth with (C log n+1 , C 1 , w 1 ) for t = 2n 5 c(n)p(n) times and receives t answers. If one of these answers is consistent with the transcript of the protocol so far, then denote the first such answer by w log n+1 = (b log n+1 , r log n+1 ), and in this case S * sends the message a log n+1 = S log n+1 (b log n+1 , r log n+1 ,q log n+1 ) to R. Otherwise, S * aborts the execution of the protocol.
(d) In the remainder of the commit stage S * acts as follows:
i. For every k and in every round i ∈ {(k − 1) log n + 2, . . . , k log n}, the malicious sender S * simulates the honest sender S with input w (k−1) log n+1 . ii. For every integer k and in every round k log n + 1 the malicious sender S * receives R's message q k log n+1 , and computes the description of the circuit C k log n+1 = S k log n+1 (·, ·,q k log n+1 ) obtained from the circuit S k log n+1 by fixingq k log n+1 as its third input. Then, S * queries Sam τ,F ,sign depth with (C k log n+1 , C (k−1) log n+1 , w (k−1) log n+1 ) for t = 2n 5 c(n)p(n) times and receives t answers. If one of these answers is consistent with the transcript of the protocol so far, then denote the first such answer by w k log n+1 = (b k log n+1 , r k log n+1 ), and in this case S * sends a k log n+1 = S k log n+1 (b k log n+1 , r k log n+1 ,q k log n+1 ) to R. Otherwise, S * aborts the execution of the protocol.
The reveal stage:
(a) S * queries Sam τ,F ,sign depth with (⊥, C d(n) , w d(n) ) for n times, and receives n pairs b
Otherwise, S * aborts the execution of the protocol.
Two minor technical details were omitted from the description. First, according to the description of Sam (Section 3.1), whenever Sam is queried multiple times with the same input, it returns the exact same answer. Thus, whenever S * queries Sam more than once with the same input, S * has to make sure that the queries are all different (for example, by artificially embedding the query number to one of the circuits in the query). Second, in order for S * 's queries to be legal, it should hold that the circuit C k log n+1 is a refinement of the circuit C (k−1) log n+1 for every integer k (as discussed in Section 3.1). This can be done very easily by embedding the description of each C (k−1) log n+1 inside each C k log n+1 (i.e., the output of C i is the sequence of bitsā i instead of only the bit a i ).
We proceed by arguing that the malicious sender S * successfully completes the commit stage with high probability. Then, given that S * has successfully completed the commit stage, we prove that the transcript of the commit stage is distributed identically to the transcript of the commit stage in an honest execution of the protocol. This enables us to use the fact that the commitment scheme is statistically-hiding, and therefore a random transcript can be revealed both as a commitment to b = 0 and as a commitment to b = 1, with almost equal probabilities.
Lemma 3.5. The malicious sender S * successfully completes the commit stage with probability at least 1 − 1/(n 3 p(n)) over the choices of τ, F , sign and r R .
Proof. The malicious sender S * may abort the commit stage only in rounds of the form k log n + 1. For every integer 1 ≤ k ≤ c(n)−1 log n we denote by E k the event in which S * aborts in round k log n + 1 of the commit stage. Then, the probability that S * fails to complete the commit stage is
where the probability is taken over the choices of τ, F , sign and r R . We show that for every 1 ≤ k ≤ c(n)−1 log n it holds that Pr [E k ] ≤ 1/(n 3 c(n)p(n)), which yields the correctness of the lemma. For simplicity, we first consider the case k = 1, and then show that the exact same argument generalizes for general k in a straightforward manner.
At the beginning of the protocol, after receiving q 1 from the receiver, S * queries Sam with Q 1 = (C 1 , ⊥, ⊥) and receives an answer w 1 = (b 1 , r 1 ). The description of Sam implies that w 1 is uniformly distributed among all possible inputs of the sender. S * then uses w 1 to simulate the honest sender during the first log n rounds by sending the bit a i = S i (b 1 , r 1 ,q i ) in each of these rounds. In round log n + 1, the malicious sender S * queries Sam with (C log n+1 , C 1 , w 1 ) for t = 2n 5 c(n)p(n) times and receives t answers. We claim that since each a i is a bit and we consider here only log n of them, then at least one of these answers will be consistent with the transcript of the protocol so far with high probability. Moreover, we show that this holds for any random coins of the receiver, and therefore from this point on we fix the random coins of the receiver. Note that by the description of Sam and the circuit C 1 , these t answers are chosen independently and uniformly at random from all possible inputs of the sender (Sam outputs each of these t answers using a different permutation from the family F provided to Sam, and each permutations in this family is chosen independently and uniformly at random). Since the random coins of the receiver are fixed, the values a 1 , . . . , a log n can be viewed as a deterministic function of the input w 1 . Let us denote this function by h : {0, 1} q(n) → {0, 1} log n , where q(n) is the bit-length of the sender's input. Then, it remains to analyze success probability of S * in the following experiment:
, . . . , w (t) log n+1 ∈ {0, 1} q(n) are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
• S * is successful if h(w 1 ) = h w
In order to analyze this experiment, we consider a set of "bad" inputs for h. This set consists of all inputs w for which the set h −1 (h(w)) is very small relative to {0, 1} q(n) (less than some polynomial fraction). In case that w 1 is not in this bad set, then S * has a very high success probability, and the probability that w 1 is in this set is rather low. More formally, let
then since the range of h contains at most n elements, we have that
Therefore, the probability that S * aborts in round log n + 1 can be upper bounded as follows
More generally, in every round of form k log n + 1 for k > 1, the malicious sender S * holds some input w (k−1) log n+1 , which is uniformly distributed among all inputs of the sender. This w (k−1) log n+1 was used by S * to simulate the honest sender in rounds (k − 1) log n + 1, . . . , k log n. Then, S * uses Sam to sample independently and uniformly at random t elements from the set of all inputs that are consistent with the transcript of the protocol in the first (k−1) log n rounds. Therefore, it is only required that one of these inputs will be consistent with w (k−1) log n+1 on the answers it provided in rounds (k − 1) log n + 1, . . . , k log n and the same argument as before goes through, with the only difference that in this case the function h is defined only over the set of inputs which are consistent with the first (k − 1) log n rounds (and not over the whole set {0, 1} q(n) ).
In the following lemma we show that given that S * has successfully completed the commit stage, the transcript of the commit stage is distributed identically to the transcript of the commit stage in an honest execution of the protocol. Formally, we define two the following two distributions:
• D * n = view S * ,R (n) is the distribution of the view of R in the commit stage when interacting with the malicious sender S * (1 n ). This view consists of R's random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from S * . The distribution is taken over R's random coins and over the uniform choice of τ, F and sign.
• D n = view S,R (n) is the distribution of the view of R in the commit stage when interacting with the honest sender S(1 n , b, r S ). This view consists of R's random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from S. The distribution is taken over the random coins of R and S, and over the uniform choice of b ∈ {0, 1} and τ. Proof. We show that the distributions D n and D * n assign equal probabilities to every triplet (r R ,q d ,ā d ) given that S * did not abort during the commit stage. More specifically, we prove by induction on 1
For i = 1, clearly we have that Pr D n r R , q 1 = Pr D * n r R , q 1 since r R is distributed exactly the same in the two cases, and q 1 is a deterministic function of r R . Therefore we only have to show that Pr D n a 1 |r R , q 1 = Pr D * n a 1 |r R , q 1 . In the first round, the malicious sender S * queries Sam S 1 (b 1 , r 1 , q 1 ) for a uniformly distributed pair (b 1 , r 1 ) exactly as the honest sender S should do.
Assume now that the claim holds for i − 1, i.e., Pr
At this point we have to distinguish between two possible cases. The first case is that in the current round S * computes a i by simulating the honest sender using an input w which has already been sampled in an earlier round. Therefore the distribution of the resulting a i is exactly as if the honest sender S had input w to begin with, and the lemma follows inductively. The second case is that in the current round S * queries Sam τ,F ,sign depth multiple times with some query Q and obtains some w which is consistent with the transcript of the protocol up to this point. Note that by the description of Sam τ,F ,sign depth and of F , the permutation f Q which corresponds to Q was chosen uniformly at random from Π m and independently of all the other permutations in F . Therefore, w is uniformly distributed among all inputs which are consistent with the protocol's transcript until this point, and therefore the distribution of the resulting a i is exactly as if the honest sender S had input w to begin with. Thus, Pr D n a i |r R ,q i ,ā i−1 = Pr D * n a i |r R ,q i ,ā i−1 , which yields the correctness of the lemma.
We conclude the proof of Theorem 3.4 by combining Lemmata 3.5 and 3.6, and by exploiting the statistical-hiding property of the commitment scheme.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Assuming that the malicious sender S * has successfully completed the commit stage, then in the reveal stage S * uses Sam τ,F ,sign depth in order to sample uniformly and independently at random n input pairs b
from the set of all input pairs which are consistent with the transcript of the commit stage. We prove that with overwhelming probability these inputs enable S * to reveal both to b = 0 and to b = 1.
Denote by D 0 n = view S(0),R (n) the distribution of the honest receiver's view in the commit stage when interacting with the honest sender S(1 n , 0, r S ). This view consists of its random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from S, and the distribution is taken over the random coins of R and S and over the choice of τ. Similarly, let D 1 n = view S(1),R (n). Then, the assumption that the commitment scheme is statistically-hiding against an honest receiver, implies that the statistical difference between the distributions D 0 n and D 1 n is some negligible function ρ(n). We define a set of "good" transcripts. This set consists of all transcripts of the commit stage which enable S * to reveal both to b = 0 and to b = 1 with overwhelming probability. We show that with overwhelming probability the transcript is in this set. Formally, we define
Note that for every transcript trans of the commit stage and for every j ∈ [n], it holds that
where the second equality follows from Lemma 3.6. The definition of the set GOOD implies that if trans ∈ GOOD, then for all sufficiently large n it holds that min Pr τ,F ,r R b
Therefore, Pr τ,F ,r R S * fails in the reveal stage trans ∈ GOOD < 2 · 2 3 n , since a failure occurs only in the case that all n input pairs sampled in the reveal stage have b
It remains to show that the transcript is in GOOD with overwhelming probability. Lemma 3.6 and the fact that the statistical distance between the distributions D 0 n and D 1 n is at most ρ(n) imply that
where the last inequality follows from Fact 2.3. Therefore, Pr S * fails in the reveal stage ≤ Pr [trans GOOD] + Pr S * fails in the reveal stage trans ∈ GOOD
Finally, Lemma 3.5 states that S * successfully completes the commit stage with probability at least 1 − 1/(n 3 p(n)), and therefore
for all sufficiently large n.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
In this short section we combine Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 and derive the proof of Theorem 3.1. Let (S, R, V, A) be a fully-black-box O(n)-expanding construction of a weakly-binding statistically-hiding honest-receiver bitcommitment scheme from an s(n)-hard family of trapdoor permutations, in which the sender communicates at most c(n) bits during the commit stage. Denote by p(n) the polynomial for which the scheme is (1 − 1/p(n))-binding. From this point on, we fix the depth restriction function depth : N → N of the oracle Sam to be the function depth(n) =
c(n)
log n + 1. Theorem 3.4 states that there exists a polynomial-time malicious sender S * such that
for all sufficiently large n. Thus, the fully-black-box construction guarantees that
for infinitely many values of n, where A runs in time s(n), and the probability is taken also over all the possible outcomes of the internal coin tosses of A. By converting the Turing-machine A to a circuit family, and by incorporating the description of S * into this family, we obtain that there exists a circuit A * of size at most, say, s * (n) = (s(n)) 2 such that
for infinitely many values of n. The assumption that the construction is O(n)-expanding (i.e., that A when given security parameter 1 n invokes S * on security parameters which are at most 1 O(n) ), guarantees that A uses S * in a way such that Sam is queried up to depth at most depth(n) = O c(n) log n . This means that also the circuit A * queries Sam up to depth at most depth(n). We conclude the proof by observing that if s * (n) 3depth(n)+2 < 2 n/8 , then the existence of the circuit A * contradicts Theorem 3.3, and therefore s * (n) 3depth(n)+2 ≥ 2 n/8 , i.e., c(n) = Ω n log n log s(n) = Ω(n).
Refining the Relation Between Single-Server PIR and Commitment Schemes
The relation between single-server PIR and commitment schemes was first explored by Beimel et al. [1] , who showed that any single-server PIR protocol in which the server communicates at most n/2 bits to the user (where n is the size of the server's database), can be used to construct a weakly-binding statistically-hiding bitcommitment scheme. In particular, this served as the first indication that the existence of low-communication PIR protocols implies the existence of one-way functions. In this section, we refine the relation between these two fundamental primitives by improving their reduction. Informally speaking, our reduction essentially uses the reduction of Beimel et al. instantiated with a better extractor. This enables the following improvements: (1) the communication complexity of the PIR protocol is essentially preserved, (2) given a single-server PIR protocol in which the server communicates n − k bits, it is possible to commit to Ω(k) bits while executing the underlying single-server PIR protocol only once, and (3) whereas the construction of Beimel et al. was presented for single-server PIR protocols in which the server communicates at most n/2 bits, our construction can rely on single-server PIR in which the server communicates up to n − ω(log n) bits.
In what follows we state our main theorem in the current section, and then turn to formally describe the construction and prove Theorem 4.1. The construction. Fix d(n), k(n) and P as in Theorem 4.1. Figure 2 describes our construction of the commitment scheme COM P = (S, R). In the construction we use a strong d(n)/3, 2 1−d(n)/3 -extractor EXT :
whose existence is guaranteed by Proposition 2.2. The correctness of COM P follows directly from the correctness of P. In addition, notice that the total number of bits communicated by the sender in the commit stage is the total number of bits that the server communicates in P plus the seed length and the output length of the extractor EXT. Thus, the sender communicates less than n − k(n) + 2d(n) bits during the commit stage.
Joint input: security parameter 1 n . Sender's input:
Commit stage:
1. S chooses a uniformly distributed x ∈ {0, 1} n .
R chooses a uniformly distributed index
3. S and R execute the single-server PIR protocol P for database of length n, where S acts as the server with input x and R acts as the user with input i. As a result, R obtains a bit x i ∈ {0, 1}.
4. S chooses a uniformly distributed seed t ∈ {0, 1} d(n) , computes y = EXT(x, t) ⊕ s, and sends (t, y) to R.
Reveal stage:
1. S sends (s, x) to R.
2.
If the i th bit of x equals x i and y = EXT(x, t) ⊕ s, then R outputs s. Otherwise, R outputs ⊥. Proof intuition. The commit stage consists of the sender and the receiver choosing random inputs x ∈ {0, 1} n and i ∈ [n], respectively, and executing the PIR protocol P on these inputs. As a consequence, the receiver obtains a bit x i , which by the correctness of P is the i th bit of x. Now, notice that since the sender communicated only n − ω(log n) bits, then the random variable corresponding to x still has ω(log n) minentropy from the receiver's point of view (with high probability). We take advantage of this fact, and exploit the remaining min-entropy of x in order to hide the committed string s in a statistical manner (note that since it is required to reveal the seed of the extractor during the commit stage, we need a strong extractor). The formal proof of the hiding property is similar to that of Lu [29] in the bounded storage model, which is in turn based on ideas that were used for constructing pseudorandom generators for space bounded computations [33] . We note that the proof of hiding does not rely on any computational properties of the underlying PIR protocol P, but only on the assumed bound on the number of bits communicated by the server in P. The binding property follows from the security of the PIR protocol: in the reveal stage, the sender must send a value x whose i th bit is consistent with the bit obtained by the receiver during the commit stage -but this bit is not known to the sender.
Lemma 4.2. The scheme COM P is statistically hiding.
Proof. We have to show that for any computationally unbounded receiver R * and for any two strings s 0 and s 1 , the statistical distance between the distributions {view S(s 0 ),R * (n)} and {view S(s 1 ),R * (n)} (see Definition 2.6) is negligible in n. The transcript of the commit stage consists of the transcript trans P of the execution of P and of the pair (t, EXT(x, t) ⊕ s), where s is the committed string. Note that since trans P is independent of the committed string, it is sufficient to prove that the statistical distance between the distribution of (t, EXT(x, t)) given trans P and the uniform distribution is negligible in n. We argue that due to the bound on the number of bits communicated by the server in P, even after executing P, the database x still has sufficient min-entropy in order to guarantee that (t, EXT(x, t)) is sufficiently close to uniform. More specifically, let R * be an all-powerful receiver (recall that without loss of generality such an R * is deterministic), and denote by X the random variable corresponding to the value x in the scheme COM P . The following claim states the with high probability X has high min-entropy from R * 's point of view.
Claim 4.3. It holds that
, where trans P is the transcript of the embedded execution of P in COM P .
Proof. For any value of r, the random coins used by S in the execution of P, let f r : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n−k(n) be the function that maps x to the value of trans P generated by the interaction of (S(x, r), R * ), and let Col(x, r) def = {x ∈ {0, 1} n : f r (x ) = f r (x)}. Since f r has at most 2 n−k(n) possible outputs, it follows that
, then a standard averaging argument yields
Denote by U r the random variable corresponding to r in the execution of COM P . Then, the following holds for every value of x and trans P :
Note that if H ∞ (X | trans P ) < k(n)/6 for some trans P , then there exists an x for which
, and therefore Equation 4.2 implies that
Thus,
3 implies that with probability 1 − neg(n), the extractor EXT guarantees that the statistical distance between the pair (t, EXT(x, t)) (given trans P ) and the uniform distribution is at most 2 1−d(n)/3 (which is again negligible in n). Therefore the scheme COM P is statistically-hiding. More specifically, for every string s ∈ {0, 1} d(n)/6 it holds that
Therefore, for any two strings s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} d(n)/6 we have
, which is negligible in n as required.
Lemma 4.4. The scheme COM P is weakly binding.
Proof. We show that the scheme COM P is (1 − 1/n 2 )-binding. Given any malicious sender Snd * that violates the binding of the commitment scheme COM P with probability at least 1 − 1/n 2 , we construct a malicious server Srv * that breaks the security of the single-server PIR protocol P.
As an intermediate step, we first construct a malicious server that has a non-negligible advantage in predicting a uniformly chosen index held by the user in P. More specifically, we construct a malicious server Srv * and a predictor D such that
where the probability is taken over the uniform choice of i ∈ [n] and over the coin tosses of Srv * , D and U.
Recall that view Srv * ,U(i) (n) denotes the distribution on the view of Srv * when interacting with U(i) where i ∈ [n]. This view consists of its random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from U.
The malicious server Srv * follows the malicious sender Snd * in the embedded execution of P in COM P . Following the interaction, Srv * proceeds the execution of Snd * to obtain a pair (t, y) and two decommitments (x 1 , s 1 ) and (x 2 , s 2 ). If x 1 = x 2 , then Srv * fails. Otherwise, denote by j ∈ [n] the minimal index such that In order to analyze the success probability in predicting i, note that if (x 1 , s 1 ) and (x 2 , s 2 ) are valid decommitments and s 1 s 2 (i.e., S * broke the binding of COM P ), then it must hold that x 1 x 2 . In this case, let j ∈ [n] be the minimal index such that x 1 [ j] x 2 [ j], then it must be the case that i j, as otherwise R will not accept the two decommitments. Therefore, when the predictor D outputs a uniformly distributed i ∈ [n] \ { j} it will output i with probability 1/(n − 1). Thus,
In the remainder of the proof, we apply a rather standard argument in order to be fully consistent with Definition 2.5 of the security of single-server PIR. That is, we need to show that there exists a pair of indices i, j ∈ [n], a malicious server Srv * and a distinguisher D such that Pr v ← view Srv * ,U(i) (n) :
for some polynomial p(n). We prove that this holds for independently and uniformly chosen i, j ∈ [n] (and therefore there exist i and j for which this holds) where Srv * is the malicious server described above, and D = D i, j is a distinguisher that uses D as follows:
• If D outputs i, then D outputs 1.
• If D outputs j, then D outputs 0.
• Otherwise, D outputs a uniformly distributed b ∈ {0, 1}. Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a fully-black-box O(n)-expanding construction of a single-server PIR protocol from a family of trapdoor permutations in which the server communicates o(n) bits, where n is the size of the server's database. By applying Theorem 4.1 with parameters k(n) = n − o(n) and d(n) = log 2 n (actually any d(n) = ω(log n) suffices) we obtain a fully-black-box O(n)-expanding weaklybinding statistically-hiding bit-commitment scheme from a family of trapdoor permutations, in which the sender communicates o(n) bits during the commit stage, where n is the security parameter of the scheme. However, the existence of such a scheme contradicts Theorem 3.1.
On extending the lower bound to weakly-preserving constructions
Our result does not rule out weakly-preserving (fully-black-box) constructions of single-server PIR from trapdoor permutations in which the sender communicates o(n) bits to the user. We note that although weaklypreserving reductions guarantee much weaker security than polynomially-preserving reductions, investigating lower bounds for such reductions is still a very interesting research topic. Even more so as the sole construction to date of a single-server PIR protocol from trapdoor permutations uses such a reduction. A possible step towards tightening our bound is to first provide an improved lower bound on the communication complexity of statistically-hiding commitment schemes that allow the sender to commit to more than a single bit. Whereas in Section 4 we proved that any low-communication single-server PIR implies a statistically-hiding commitment scheme that allows the sender to commit to a relatively long string, our lower bound on the communication complexity of statistically-hiding commitment schemes in Section 3 serves as a bottleneck: it does not take into consideration the number of committed bits (the lower bound is only in terms of the security parameter).
It is quite possible that a much tighter lower bound can be proved for string-commitment schemes. Such a lower bound may extend the result of the current paper to the setting of weakly-preserving reductions, and prove the optimality of the single-server PIR protocol of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [27] . We note that the statistically-hiding commitment scheme of Naor et al. [31] (which is constructed from one-way permutations in a fully-black-box manner) can be used to commit to O(log n) bits while the sender communicates O(n) bits (see, for example, [32] ).
